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Abstract
Polarization of group opinions – a natural
mechanism that enables groups to stay intrinsically
cohesive – explains why after multiple interactions
individual and group opinions shift towards the
extremes. Recently, significant polarization of opinions
can be witnessed in the public discourse of many
Western societies in a range of topics. We argue here
that the prevalence of social media together with its
specific design may amplify natural group dynamics and
strengthen the divisions. We present an agent based
model wherein implementation of polarization
mechanisms together with social media properties leads
to increased segregation and radicalization of opinions.
We propose certain design choices for social media
platforms that could help ameliorate the problem.

1. Introduction
Recent years have seen major divisions within
western societies. Both in the US and Europe public
discourse is full of conflicting issues on which
constructive dialogue is increasingly more difficult.
While such topics as abortion or homosexual marriages
have always been divisive, these days a range of
seemingly unproblematic issues raise heated disputes
(e.g. membership in the EU, vaccinations, health
insurance regulations, etc.) More and more often,
positions are taken at the extremes of the possible
breadth of an opinion. While there are numerous
political, economic and societal factors that might have
led to the increase of polarization of public opinions,
there is one more characteristics of modern societies that
may contribute to the problem.
Polarization and radicalization of opinions are
nothing new. Back in the 1970-80s seminal work in
social psychology has shown that interactions within
social groups cause both the group and its constituent
individuals to dig in into their positions and – in many
circumstances – to shift their opinions towards the
extremes [17]. Yet, in real life, the mechanisms that
cause group polarization are counterbalanced by
processes that lead groups to work in concert [22]. What
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50150
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-1-9
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Magdalena Roszczyńska-Kurasińska
University of Warsaw
magda.roszczynska@gmail.com

is different now is that an increasing volume of social
interactions take place in social media rather than in face
to face contacts.
Drawing from the research in social psychology, we
argue here that current social media design distorts
group dynamics in such a way that the balance between
polarizing and unifying forces is unsettled.
To support our claims we present an agent based
model in which we implement some of the basic
mechanisms of polarization (action commitment, social
desirability, reactance) and one critical property of
social media networks – the possibility to rewire social
connections in a purposeful manner. We show that
under those conditions polarization is amplified and
happens in a wider range of situations. Interestingly
enough, rewiring – while being generally detrimental –
proves to be advantageous in select conditions: it
becomes the last resort in situations that would have
otherwise led to radicalization. While the presented
model is certainly not exhaustive and other social
mechanisms and technological specifics are at play in
the currently observed processes of polarization, it
shows that a prevalent design choice is sufficient to
produce increased opinion divides in social systems. We
conclude the paper by pointing out certain design
solutions that could help ameliorate the problem of
unchecked polarization on social media.

2. Polarization
Polarization of opinions has first been defined as a
”risky shift” of decisions after a group discussion [20].
Numerous studies have shown that this phenomenon is
ubiquitous: in a variety of situations and choices a
discussion among group members leads them to shift
their opinion toward a more extreme option than the
mean individual choice [10]. An early review by Mayers
and Lamm [14] outlined three mechanisms underlying
the attitude change that leads to opinion polarization:
social motivation, action commitment and cognitive
foundation. Social motivation refers to the desire to be
perceived favorably by relevant others. Socially
motivated individuals first test what is the general
opinion of others and then shift towards the extreme.
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Presenting a more extreme opinion creates the image of
high self-esteem and therefore is more socially desired.
Once the opinion is formed and expressed on the
group forum the second element of attitude change
activates – action commitment mechanism. The
verbalization of opinion leads to its enhancement,
making it less vulnerable to change in future.
Interestingly, even the duration of time spend on
thinking on an issue might lead to polarization of
opinion [21]. The last component – cognitive foundation
– relates to the cognitive processing of arguments,
cognitive rehearsal and acknowledging the novel
information shared between the members [22].
Two branches of research on opinion polarization,
one concentrating on the social mechanism – social
comparison theory [19] – and the second concentrating
on the cognitive aspects of dispute – persuasive
arguments theory [22] – both report similar effects of
polarization. In more recent studies, segregation and
clustering of opinions have been often found in social
media. For example, political blogs link to other blogs
of the same political ideology [1, 9]. Individuals prefer
to read content from authors who present similar
political views [11]. Analysis of political disputes on
Twitter demonstrates that networks of retweets are
clearly segregated into two clusters corresponding to the
political left and right [2].
While this polarization seems to reflect a natural
group mechanism, it is worth noting that social media
design may potentially amplify this process. First, the
pervasiveness of information on one’s social circle
increases the awareness of the opinions of relevant
others [8]. This might lead to a shift in the individual’s
own opinion in pursue of social acceptance, as was
described in the social motivation mechanism of
polarization.
Further, the prevalent design choice of social media
is to broadcast one’s content – including opinionated
statements – to all social connections at once. This
voicing of one’s attitudes constitutes both cognitive
rehearsal as well as action commitment – not only are
the views displayed on the forum of the acquaintance
group but they may also be strengthened by any positive
feedback, such as likes, follows, retweets, etc.
Finally, social media enables unprecedented
exchange of information and opinions on a daily basis,
allowing even distant individuals to influence one
another – even if this influence is passive (e.g. being
exposed to content posted by unknown others). This
intensification of information exchange increases the
probability of encountering the opposite opinion in its
extremes – sometimes even in malicious attempts to
spite (e.g. trolling). Exposure to such overstated views
may trigger another mechanism that alongside
polarization can lead to extremization of one’s opinions:

reactance – an emotional response to the reduction of
perceived freedom of choice [13]. In the context of
opinion formation reactance would manifest as
strengthening of the opposite opinion to the one
imposed,
i.e.,
radicalization
of
opinions.

3. Methodology
To investigate the possible effects of social media
design on polarization dynamics we have chosen the
agent based modelling approach. This methodology is
well suited for exploration of macro-level – systemic –
effects of individual behavior. While agent based
models rarely allow for quantitative prediction, they
offer a unique opportunity to test possible qualitative
effects of interventions and solutions that are difficult or
impossible to implement experimentally [3, 4, 5].
In an agent based model the researcher specifies the
behavior of elements and the rules that govern their
interactions and observes the behavior of the whole
system by describing it with a few aggregate variables
(sometimes called order parameters). Agent based
models are thus constructed in a bottom-up way – the
assumptions concern the individual (micro) level rules
of behavior and the hypotheses are tested at the level of
the system (macro).
Agent based models are used to analyze various
complex systems, but one of the most fruitful and rich
areas of their application has been the modelling of
social systems. In particular, opinion dynamics models
– such as the one described in this paper – have shown,
for example, how the natural drive to follow majority
choice results in the final distribution of voting [12, 26]
or how social influence of opinion leaders allows
minority opinion to survive in the sea of majority [16].
While many early opinion dynamics models relied
fully on physics based mechanics [12], recent models
often draw from social psychological knowledge to
inform the construction of the agents representing
individuals and their interactions [5]. The challenge in
such modelling attempts is to choose the most
appropriate psychological variables for the agents’
characteristics and most fitting social contexts for them
to interact. On the one hand, the model needs to
realistically depict social processes but on the other
hand inclusion of too many variables might render the
model intractable and impossible to interpret.
As an example, in the Weisbuch-Deffuant bounded
confidence model [24], which served as the starting
point for the model presented here, the authors set out to
investigate how peoples’ tolerance for different views
affects the process of social influence and the resulting
opinion variation. They observed that individuals
usually are not impacted by opinions that are very
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different from their own. Therefore if they meet a person
that presents a vastly different view, they will ignore his
or her beliefs and instead will seek influence or advice
from someone else, whose opinion is within the limits
of the individual’s tolerance for differences.
In this model the tolerance for differences is the
variable under scrutiny and all other possible design
choices are kept as simple as possible. Thus, agents have
the theoretical possibility to interact with any other
agent in the system, provided that their opinions are
within the tolerance limits. The opinions are continuous
– ranging from 0 to 1 – and the agents do not have any
other properties that could differentiate them. At each
simulation step, a pair of agents is drawn randomly (i.e.
they “meet” to discuss opinions) and if their views are
within the tolerance (which is identical for every agent)
they shift their opinion slightly towards that of their
interaction partner.
The resulting opinions in the social system of this
design depend on the value of tolerance. If the tolerance
is high (>0.3), all agents converge on one opinion (the
middle point, ~0.5); when it is low, a few opinion
clusters form. The lower the tolerance, the more clusters
appear and this relation scales as 1 over 2 times the
tolerance value.
The basic Weisbuch-Deffuant model is the simplest
opinion dynamics model that produces clear divisions in
the final opinion distribution fully accountable to a
single parameter and therefore is well suited for
studying polarization.

4. The model
To test how social media design might impact
polarization process we have designed an agent based
model wherein the agents influence each other in a way
similar to the Weisbuch-Deffuant bounded confidence
model but also behave according to Myers and Lamm’s
polarization mechanisms conceptual scheme [14].
Therefore, the agents have an opinion that they
broadcast to others and are influenced by opinions
presented by their social relations – provided that the
opinions are within their tolerance for difference. If this
is the case, the agents shift their opinions towards that
of their social links. However, tolerance for difference
is not a static trait of the agents; rather, it changes as the
agent’s confidence in her opinion changes: the more
confident the agent is, the lower her tolerance for
different opinions.
Drawing from the Myers & Lamm’s concepts, we let
the agents be motivated by social comparison – that is,
they seek to be perceived favorably by others.
Therefore, their confidence is affected by being in
majority within their social circle. If the agent is in

majority, her confidence grows, if she is in minority, it
drops.
Moreover, confidence also changes when the agent
is being “heard” by others, following Myers & Lamm’s
proposal that verbalization of one’s opinion affects the
actor’s attitude. If an agent influences another one
whose opinion is within her tolerance for difference, her
confidence rises.
The agents in the model are linked into a network of
social relations. Since we interpret the system as
operating on social media, we allow the agents to cut off
their links and create new connections – that is, to rewire
their social network. Therefore the agents can, from
time to time, severe a relation that is far beyond their
tolerance level and instead connect to another person.
It is worth stressing that to keep the model tractable
it was intentionally rendered non exhaustive – both with
respect to psychological mechanisms of social influence
as well as the technological design solutions.
Investigating the effects of e.g. tie strength, power
structures or algorithmic filtering would require
separate modelling studies.

4.1 Implementation – the basic model
The modeled social system is composed of N = 300
individuals, connected by undirected links into a locally
clustered network similar to a small world network
(SWN) with an average node degree d = 20. The size
and connectivity of the network were chosen to simulate
a medium sized organization or a large acquaintance
clique in which a certain number of meaningful
interactions (transmitting sufficient amount of
information or opinions) per individual can take place in
a day. To a certain degree it is possible to emulate a
system of larger size in this model by manipulating the
speed constant and probability constants (as introduced
later) but the model was not intended to simulate a truly
big system (e.g. the whole Facebook network).
Polarization has been defined in small group studies and
therefore to simulate much bigger systems a careful
choice of other mechanisms might be necessary.
The agents interact with their link neighbors.
Specifically, each agent in the network is characterized
by an opinion (ranging from 0 to 100 and drawn
randomly from a flat distribution at the beginning of
simulation) and her tolerance for differing opinions that
defines the range of opinions that can influence her (i.e.
form a range around her opinion +/- tolerance). The
model was also run using other opinion distributions at
the start (normal and bimodal, results not presented), but
the flat distribution resembles a discussion on a topic on
which the individuals do not yet have an opinion.
Therefore, it is more apt for the study of polarization of
opinions than normal distribution (possibly,
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characterizing an already established issue, on which
people do not differ much in opinions) or bimodal
distribution (an established issue that has already
polarized public opinion).
In each simulation step, each agent i randomly draws
one of her social connections j and is influenced by his
or her opinions (if it is within her tolerance range) – she
shifts her opinion Oi toward the opinion Oj of the
selected agent by a fraction of the difference of their
opinions:
𝑗

𝑖
𝑂𝑡+1
= 𝑂𝑡𝑖 + 2𝑠 ∗ (𝑂𝑡 − 𝑂𝑡𝑖 )

Eq. 1
where s is the speed constant that affects the
volatility of the influence process, set at 0.1 for all
simulations.
The process of social influence here is asymmetrical,
resembling the Weisbuch-Deffuant model as
implemented on scale-free networks [23]. That is, only
the agent i changes her opinion in this mechanisms,
while agent j – the source of influence – stays with her
previous opinion. This is important for our intended
comparisons between real life contacts and interaction
on social media. On social media, a user broadcasts
information for all to see (friends or public, depending
on the settings). Therefore, in the act of “communicating
out” the opinions of the user herself are not affected by
those of her readers – it is only the recipients that can be
affected. Feedback (such as likes, follows, etc.) affects
the opinions of the broadcaster in an indirect way, as
described later.
The asymmetry of interactions, as has been noted
[23], also helps to relate the power law distribution of
connections into an asymmetrical influence process –
people that are heavily connected (hubs) will have a
greater chance of influencing others but will not be
themselves more prone to being influenced, which
reflects the direction of opinion spread in real social
networks [15, 18].
The tolerance value can be interpreted as the
characteristics of the topic being discussed in the
network. Important issues, e.g. related to the value
system, would cause smaller tolerance (i.e. lower
acceptance of differing opinions) and trivial issues
would mean bigger tolerance (translating into a wider
range of opinions that can influence an individual). As
has been described in the previous section, in a fully
connected network introducing tolerance ranges into the
process of influence produces varied numbers of peaks
in the final distribution of opinions, depending on the
value of tolerance [24]. In a scale-free network with low
connectivity (~4 average links per node) the number of
peaks and the dispersion of opinions around them are
different, but for more connected structures, they
resemble the fully connected case [23]. Therefore, we
also expected similar effects for a SWN with 20
connections per node on average.

We have used such defined model as the null model
that provides a baseline for comparisons.

4.2. Introducing confidence dynamics
In the next step we have modified the influence
dynamics to add to it the mechanisms of polarizing
group processes [14]. To that end, we have added
another agent characteristics, confidence C, ranging
from 0 to 0.99 and drawn randomly at the beginning of
the simulations from a normal distribution with mean
0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1. This parameter
describes the self-assurance of an individual in her
opinion. The polarization mechanisms of social
desirability and action commitment (as well as cognitive
rehearsal, not modeled), can be thought of as depending
on changing the confidence of opinions within the
group. This internal trait then can be used as a modifier
for the social influence process.
First, since polarization studies show that
strengthening of one’s confidence depends on assessing
what is the social norm in one’s group (social
desirability mechanism), we assume that confidence of
agents depends on their being in majority with regards
to their held opinion. Each agent i assess how many of
her neighbors (countSO) voice an opinion that is within
the limits of her tolerance – i.e. have similar opinions –
and computes what fraction of her total contacts
(countN) that group constitutes. She changes her
confidence Ci depending on how much of a majority she
is in (her confidence increases if she is in majority, and
it decreases if she is in minority):
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑂
𝑖
𝐶𝑡+1
= 𝐶𝑡𝑖 + 1⁄3 𝑠 ∗ (
− 0.5)
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑁

Eq. 2
The speed constant is divided by 3 to keep
confidence dynamics slower than opinion dynamics.
Second, we let the agents grow confident when they
transmit influential opinions, resembling the effects of
publicly committing to an opinion by verbalizing it in
group discussion, as described by the action
commitment mechanism. Each agent j that has been
used as a source of influence (i.e. was drawn by another
agent in that agent’s process of social influence),
increases her confidence proportionally to the similarity
of their opinions (the more similar the opinions are, the
more confidence the broadcaster gains; if the follower’s
opinion is outside the agent’s tolerance, her confidence
drops):
𝑗

𝑗

𝐶𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝑡 +

𝑗

𝑗

𝑠∗(𝑇∗(1−𝐶𝑡 )−|𝑂𝑡𝑖 − 𝑂𝑡 |)
𝑗

𝑡∗(1−𝐶𝑡 )

Eq. 3

where T is tolerance. The speed constant for this
confidence dynamics mechanism is bigger than for
minority / majority related changes to counteract the fact
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that being chosen as influence source is much rarer than
assessment of majority opinion.
This behavior in face to face contacts is easy to
imagine – a person who is listened to and whose
opinions are repeated among group members would
grow more confident. In social media this is also visible,
albeit differently. All signs of positive responses for
one’s broadcast content (e.g. likes, follows, shares,
reposts, comments, etc.) increase positive emotions and
are (sometimes desperately) sought after, and can well
predict whether the author will publish again or not.
Finally, to implement the effects of confidence on
social influence dynamics, we modify an agent’s
tolerance range TR by multiplying it by the inverse of
her confidence. That is, high confidence results in
narrower tolerance limits and low confidence broadens
those limits. A person who is unsure whether his or her
opinion is right, would be more prone to seek influence
from individuals with even very different mindset. In
contrast, a person who is very sure of his or her
correctness will likely shut out those who broadcast
different opinions, even if that difference is not really
big.
𝑇𝑅𝑡𝑖 = {𝑂𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑡𝑖 ), 𝑂𝑡𝑖 + 𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑡𝑖 ) } Eq. 4

4.2. Reactance implementation
In our next modification we have implemented the
process of reactance, i.e. changing one’s opinion in the
direction contrary to the influence of others when such
influence threatens one’s freedom of choice [13]. In face
to face communication, reactance is visible in rejecting
persistent attempts at influence. For example, a person
seeing an obtrusive ad for one brand of soda on a
vending machine, might choose a different drink – even
against her preference – just to maintain a feeling of
freedom of choice. The phenomenon of reactance can be
traced in social media for example in reactions to
trolling attempts (i.e. presenting conflicting and extreme
opinions intended to start a dispute or to spite) or when
confronted with content of a vastly different viewpoint.
A recipient of such content or target of trolling usually
gets involved in a heated discussion, voicing opinions
that are closer to the extreme just to get the upper hand
in the conflict, even though in normal circumstances she
would not have voiced them. Since verbalizing opinions
is an act of action commitment, reversing opinions to
their previous state might not be possible, especially if
they receive positive feedback from other involved
disputants.
Reactance was implemented in the model as the
inverse of social influence. With a small probability
(varied from 0 to 0.06) each agent in each simulation
step had a chance of “being reached” by content from
outside her tolerance range. That is, she randomly drew

a link neighbor k with opinion outside her limits
(provided she had such neighbors). The agent then
adjusts her opinion to move away from the intolerable
neighbor, increasing the difference of opinions
proportionally to the breadth of the difference:
𝑖
𝑂𝑡+1
= 𝑂𝑡𝑖 + 2𝑠 ∗ (𝑂𝑡𝑖 − 𝑂𝑡𝑘 )
Eq. 5
These two mechanisms of polarization – confidence
that limits the tolerance for different opinions and
reactance – and their co-occurrence, provided us three
models to be tested against the null model: confidence,
reactance and both confidence and reactance. To this
specification we added models that implement one
selected trait of social media - rewiring.
To implement the possibility of purposefully
adjusting one’s social connections – rewiring – we allow
the agents to seek for one social contact per simulation
step that is outside the agents tolerance range (if the
agent has any such) and whose opinion is the farthest
away from the agent’s. This connection is severed and
instead the agent links to another, randomly selected
node to keep the network density stable. While in terms
of network connectivity this moves us from an SWN to
a more random connection structure (effectively
increasing the probability p of weak ties) it is worth
noting that the connections are not truly random as they
reflect opinion structure.
The model was implemented in the NetLogo agent
based modelling platform [25]. The versions of the
model described above (the null model and 7 possible
combinations of confidence, rewiring and reactance)
have been run as separate simulations for 700 time steps
and with 50 repetitions for each combination of
parameters.

5. Results
When comparing the implemented group dynamics
mechanisms to the null model we were interested in
assessing how segregated are the final opinions, for
which tolerance levels the segregation happens and how
close to the extremes the opinion peaks are. To assess
this, we have computed Shanon’s entropy on the final
opinion distributions as well as measured the number of
modes using a statistics developed by [7]:

𝑚=

1 𝑛
∑ |𝑥 −𝑥𝑖−1 |
𝑀 𝑖=2 𝑖

Eq. 6
where M is the highest frequency in the histogram
(i.e. the maximum value), n is the set of bins in the
histogram and xi is the frequency in the bin i.
A value of 2.40 is roughly the threshold for bimodal
distributions and a value above 4 describes a distribution
with three or more modes.
Additionally, we have inspected opinion histograms
from sample simulation runs for increasing values of
tolerance and have measured the frequency of extreme
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tend to form around the midpoint of the opinion scale
(i.e. the agents are not segregated into clearly polarized
opinions), there is considerable variation in their size –
some opinions are very popular but there are also many
opinions that garner some small following. In sum,
introducing confidence into the social influence process,
while dividing opinions in a wide range of tolerance
values, also increases the diversity of opinions and
reduces segregation as agents’ growing confidence
counteracts the force to unify on single opinion peaks.
10.0

Modes measure

opinions (10% of the lower and upper opinion range) to
see the degree of radicalization of opinions.
The null model resembles the properties of a fully
connected lattice in Weisbuch-Defuant boundedconfidence model (Fig 1, Fig 2). For values of tolerance
above 23% of the opinion range, the opinions of all
agents converge on the midpoint; tolerance below 20%
threshold produces two peaks of segregated opinions,
that grow increasingly distant as tolerance is decreased
(Fig 3). Below the tolerance value of 10% of opinion
range, the number of peaks grows, and the lower the
tolerance, the less distinct they become.
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Rewire & Reactance

Figure 1. Entropy values for the different
models computed on final distributions of
opinions (after 700 simulation steps); each
point is an average of 50 simulation runs.
Adding the possibility to purposefully rewire
connections amplifies the segregation process in that the
segregation is complete (i.e. all agent’s opinions
converge on the peaks, with minimal dispersion as
reflected in the entropy values, and as can be seen from
the single bin peaks in the histograms in Fig 3, right
panel) and in that the range of tolerance values that
generate divisions is slightly wider. Specifically, the
first threshold (that produces two peaks) is at 27%
tolerance. In all, rewiring reduces the diversity of
opinions and slightly increases polarization for less
important issues (i.e. those characterized by higher
tolerance for differing opinions).
Introducing the mechanisms that change agents’
confidence and therefore make tolerance range
dynamical, changes the number of convergence points
for agents’ opinions. For all the investigated tolerance
values, at least two peaks appeared in the final
distribution of opinions (m value > 2.5, Fig 2). However,
the peaks are generally smaller and there is a lot of
dispersion around them (Fig 3, left panel). While they

Confidence

Null

Confidence & Reactance

Reactance

Confidence & Rewire

Rewire

Confidence, Rewire & Reactance

Rewire & Reactance

Figure 2. Modes measure for the different
models computed on final distributions of
opinions (after 700 simulation steps); each
point is an average of 50 simulation runs. The
y scale has been truncated at 10 to increase
readability.
Implementation of both rewiring and confidence
results in typical polarization dynamics. The diversity
introduced by agents’ confidence all but disappears –
even at high tolerance levels (i.e. 50% of the opinion
range, Fig 4) clear opinion peaks form and there is little
dispersion around them. Rather, all agents converge on
two opinion bins that are visibly segregated. This
segregation is also visible at very low tolerance – many
opinion peaks form, but they are very distinct and
separated by gaps in opinion frequencies.
When only confidence mechanisms were at play,
low values of tolerance produced divisions in opinions,
but they were not so segregated and some midpoint
opinions were present (Fig 3). In all, this shows that
combining the natural group segregation mechanisms
with the possibility to purposefully shape connections
amplifies the polarization dynamics in a non-linear way.
Rewiring alone increased segregation and
confidence mechanisms introduced segregation into
issues whose importance (tolerance) would not
normally warrant it. Together, these two mechanisms
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produce a social system where opinions are almost
perfectly segregated for a very wide range of issues.
The mechanism of reactance, when introduced into
the null model by itself strengthens the segregation of
opinions at a wider range of tolerance values, i.e. by

producing clear two peaks for tolerance between 20%
and 30% of opinion range (Fig 2). Moreover, for lower
values of tolerance, where in the null model a few more
or less distinct peaks form, reactance clearly pushes
agents to converge predominantly on two opinions only.
Model
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Figure 3. Histograms of final opinions after 700 simulation steps in sample simulation runs for the
null model, the model with confidence and the model with rewiring. For each model 9 simulations
were run, for different values of tolerance (labelled on the right) resulting in 9 histograms.
For really low tolerance levels (<10%) those two
peaks are separated by tiny groups of followers of
midpoint views, but this dispersion is minimal (Fig 6).
Yet, the most visible and striking result is that reactance
is the force that pushes the opinion peaks to the
extremes. As can be seen from the frequencies for high
and low opinion values (Fig 5) most agents converge on
the poles of the opinion scale for a wide range of
tolerance values (up to around 30% tolerance, above
which a single opinion peak is visible).
Adding the confidence mechanisms to the reactance
phenomenon produces the most polarized and
segregated opinion distribution of all presented here.
For all values of tolerance investigated, clear factions
form at the end of the opinion spectrum with little to no
dispersion around them – there is simply no middle
viewpoint present. Even for very low values of tolerance
(10% and below), where normally many separate peaks
are present, the two poles dominate the view. On the
other hand, for higher values of tolerance (> 35%) where
reactance alone was not enough to divide opinions,
together with the strengthening force of confidence it
produces clear divisions. What is more, the opinions are
not only perfectly segregated but they also converge at
the very extremes of the scale (Fig 6). What happens

when the rewiring possibilities of social media are
added to the picture?
Interestingly enough, combining all the group
mechanisms together with the rewiring possibility of
social media gives an opinion distribution that is more
diversified than that without the rewiring. A few,
dispersed midpoint opinions are present, especially in
the lower ranges of tolerance values (Fig 6) and the
extreme opinions are not so frequent among agents (Fig
5). It might seem from this that social interactions in
physical space, where we cannot “delete” social
relations should produce more radicalization and
stronger segregation than social media. This puzzling
result warrants a closer analysis.
The first thing to notice is that in face to face
interactions extreme reactance leading to radicalization
of views is rare – much rarer than the 6% probability
introduced in the model. Simply, groups and individuals
have a wider range of behaviors available that allow
them to avoid protracted conflicts. Even if a stubborn
party where to pester another group with attempts
similar to online trolling this most often would not lead
to open fights or intractable disputes resulting in
radicalization of opinions, because the target can
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employ a variety of strategies to quench the fire before
it spreads.

willing to change his or her opinion. If change is
impossible, the interlocutors simply change the topic,
avoiding the conflict.
This is especially visible in situations where cutting
the contact is impossible – for example among family
members or coworkers that naturally need to coexist in
the same physical space and often need to collaborate.
In those cases, opponents in one issue can find
similarities of opinions in another issue to improve the
mutual connection that enables cooperation. What is
more, very often people are able to highly respect
another person for her professional knowledge or skills
while knowing that their political or moral viewpoints
are irreconcilable. Stressing similarities and
diversifying the topical plateaus for interaction is thus
the main counterbalance to the polarizing forces such as
reactance.
The situation is different in online social life.
Trolling is simple and while it can be emotionally
draining its costs are far less than what open conflicts in
physical space incur. Even without such malicious
intents, content of all viewpoints is easily spread and
there are high chances of encountering opposing
opinions in everyday online functioning.
Moreover, social media design does not allow
diversifying social relations along topical domains and
therefore the strategy to find similarities in another area
is not available. Often, one divisive issue can destroy an
otherwise fruitful collaboration. The only solution is to
cut the link altogether to reduce the pressing need to
react negatively to adverse opinions. It is simply hard to
accept the opinions on a trivial matter of a person with
whom one is in violent dispute over moral issues. For
these reasons, the possibility to rewire (that is: cut) some
links in social media is actually reducing polarization
and radicalization of conflicting parties.
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Figure 4. Histograms of the final opinions
after 700 simulation steps in sample
simulation runs for the model with both
confidence and rewiring. Nine simulations
were run, for different values of tolerance
(labelled on the right) resulting in 9
histograms.
For example, in physical contacts people tend to
“agree to disagree”. If opposing views are identified, it
can be quickly established how far the opponent is
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Figure 5. Frequencies of opinions from the high (10%) and low (10%) ends of the opinion scale at
the end of simulations for the various models. Each point is an average of 50 simulation runs.
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This explains the counter intuitive amelioration of
polarization in the model resulting from combining all
group mechanisms with social media rewirability. The
seeming improvement from the “real life” case is due to
the fact that the model does not implement other
confrontation avoidance techniques that are abundant in
physical interaction and are actually more effective than
connection severance. Moreover, the model might
underestimate the probability of reactance in social
media as opinion “wars”, trolling attempts and similar
actions are probably positively correlated with issue
importance (i.e. tolerance). However, this analysis of
limitations of the model gives clear clues as to how to
improve social media design to counteract the negative
phenomena of polarization and radicalization.

amplified by social media design they may lead to
disproportional divisions. The model presented here
shows that dynamics of individuals’ confidence which
is a result of the polarization mechanisms of social
desirability and action commitment causes even nonimportant issues to become divisive (i.e. issues for
which individuals have wider tolerance for different
opinions). On the other hand, the possibility to
purposefully rewire links, which is a prevalent design
choice in social media platforms, increases the degree of
segregation of opinions. Together, these two
mechanisms lead to more complete segregation of
opinions over a much larger range of issues.
When the phenomenon of reactance is added to the
picture, the segregated opinions tend to radicalize – not
only are the individuals predominantly grouped into
distinct opinion peaks, but also the opinions they
commit to are close to the extremes of the opinion scale.

6. Conclusions
While polarization mechanisms in natural contexts
help groups maintain inner cohesiveness, when
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Figure 6. Histograms of final opinions after 700 simulation steps in sample simulation runs for the
three models with reactance. For each model 9 simulations were run, for different values of
tolerance (labelled on the right) resulting in 9 histograms.
Surprisingly, rewiring possibility ameliorates the
polarization in models where reactance is present. This
is due to the fact that cutting social links prevents
protracted conflicts and subsequent radicalization.
In physical space socializing “deleting” relations is
often impossible. Therefore groups and individuals have
developed certain behaviors and strategies that enable
them to avoid the worsts of conflicts. For example, they

tend to avoid conflict prone topics and diversify the
relations with respect to topic, importance, etc.
This translates into a complex structure of social
links wherein individual ego networks are composed of
partially overlapping subnetworks that serve different
social or professional purposes. This concept –
embeddedness of social networks [6] – ensures that a
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social system can perform complex functions that are
interdependent but not fully dependent on each other.
To help ameliorate the problem of polarization on
social media, solutions that would help diversify ego
networks and that would strengthen their embeddedness
can be designed. Certain social media platforms are
already topic specific (e.g. LinkedIn, ResearchGate) but
the biggest ones are not (Facebook, Twitter). Moreover,
users are encouraged to link their different identities
from various platforms, by e.g. logging in everywhere
with a single (Facebook) ID and to import all their social
contacts from one platform to another. In effect, the ego
networks are collapsed and create a huge amalgamate
that in physical social context would be unmanageable.
With the collapse of the social network comes also the
collapse of areas, topics and issues. Content from all
platforms is combined and broadcast for all to see. In
effect, conflicts from one sphere might be generalized
to other spheres and may become a general divide across
many areas of social functioning.
Maintaining diversified ego networks could be
promoted by tagging connections and keeping content
thematically separated and flowing over different links.
In effect a complex multiplex network could form.
Moreover, strategies for conflict avoidance could be
implemented. Instead of simple “thumbs up” and
“thumbs down” more complex assessment could be
available within one click – for example ”agree to
disagree”.
Social media limits certain behaviors due to the
affordances of the technology. Yet, the potential to
enrich ICT mediated social interactions is immense and
innovative solutions are sprouting in many platforms.
However, we advocate to analyze each new concept
with respect to how it can affect known social processes
and phenomena to avoid turning those processes into
distorted reflection of what they are in real space.
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